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Abstract Looking at a person’s expression is a good way of telling what she feels—
what emotions she has. Why is that? Is it because we see her emotion, or is it because
we infer her mental state from her expression? My claim is that there is a sense in
which we do see the person’s emotion. I first argue that expressions are physical
events that carry information about the emotions that produce them. I then examine
evidence suggesting that specific brain areas and structures are involved in the
process that extracts such information and makes it available in the content of visual
experience. I consider only what happens in early stages of visual processing and
make no claim about the role of simulation and empathy.
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1 Introduction
It is a common view that mental states are private entities. Since perception is
awareness of objects in the environment, how can we see something that is as private
as an emotion? In what follows I argue that we can see what emotions others have
when two conditions obtain. One is that expressions carry information about the
emotions that they express. The other is that the visual system functions to detect
these states and it does so by extracting the information that expressions carry. I
should note that my approach will focus on early stages of visual processing and on
the brain structures that underpin it. Nothing of what I will say is incompatible with
the fact that mature visual experiences of other people’s emotions—the experiences
that we have when we see others as being sad or angry—are the result of the activity
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of two systems: the perceptual and the cognitive. My goal in this paper is to provide a
partial account of how the visual system works in producing such experiences.
Finally, I should note that my approach is entirely compatible with the view that
simulation and empathy play an important role in our ability to see other people’s
emotions.
2 Theory of Mind and Emotion Perception
Expressions are patterns of changes in the face.1 It is a common philosophical view
that our ability to make sense of these (and other) changes depends on having a theory
of mind. This is known as the ‘theory-theory’ approach to mental states (Armstrong
1968; Lewis 1972). In this view, there is a theory of mind in much the same way as
there is a theory of gases. The thermodynamic theory of gases posits states—called
temperature, pressure, and volume—that stand in certain relationships approximating
those expressed in the ideal gas laws (‘approximating’ because no real gas is ideal).
These states and relationships enable us to explain and predict the behaviour of gases.
In the same way, with the theory-theory approach to the mind, we posit psychological
properties of subjects; these properties stand in various relationships to one another
and to the behaviour of subjects. We suppose, for example, that subjects have beliefs
and desires, and that they behave in such a way that, if their beliefs are true, their
desires are satisfied. In other words, there is a theory sometimes known as folk-
psychology that connects mental states and behaviour. If this approach to the mind is
right, how do we arrive at justified beliefs about other people’s mental states? By a
simple application of hypothetico-deduction. We note a person’s behaviour within its
circumstances and look for the hypothesis about that person’s mental states which
best explains her behaviour. This exercise is an inference from the person’s behaviour
to the mental states that best explain it.
How do these considerations bear upon the claim that we see what others feel by
looking at their facial expressions? To answer this question we need to consider two
things. One is the theory that links patterns of changes in the face with emotions. The
other is the role that this theory plays in our ability to see what emotions others have.
The theory says that there is a correlation between certain patterns of changes and
emotions. For example, there is a correlation between happiness and smiling such that
it is likely that a person smiles when she is happy. It is plausible to think that a theory
of mind will include a number of beliefs about the relationship between patterns of
changes in the body and emotions.
Now, what role do these beliefs play in the ability to read what others feel? It is
commonly accepted that knowledge and belief influence the way we see the world.
For example, it is when I am familiar with a specific convention about the measure-
ment of time with devices like clocks that I am able to tell the time simply by looking
at the position of a clock’s hands on a dial. In this case my beliefs about clocks enable
me to see what time it is. The enabling character of belief can be described in terms of
an unconscious inference that I make as I look at the clock’s dial, and which allows
1 In this paper I am concerned only with facial expressions of emotions. It is for this reason that I focus only
on visual perception as opposed to perception in general.
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me to infer the time from the position of the hands. The same argument applies to the
experience of looking at people’s facial expressions. Beliefs about the correlation
between emotions and patterns of bodily changes enable me to see the changes as
expressions of emotions. This view provides an explanation for the observation that
we can often tell what others feel by looking at their expressions.
In spite of its good explanatory power, the view has at least one serious drawback.
We are all familiar with the observation that infants respond to facial expressions of
emotions in others. This everyday observation is corroborated by empirical evidence
(Nelson 1987) showing that infants are more attracted to expressions of positive
emotions, while they tend to avoid and respond with fear to expressions of negative
emotions. Prima facie, the evidence shows that facial expressions prompt positive
and negative responses in infants. This, however, is not the only possible explanation.
Consider the case of an infant avoiding an expression of anger. Since avoidance is a
way of reacting to threats, we may suppose that the expression presents the infant
with some sort of threat. But exactly what is it that makes the expression threatening?
If we take expressions to be ways of signalling emotions, we can say that the threat
consists in the emotion that the expression shows, and not in the expression alone.
After all, it is the person’s emotion, not her expression, that constitutes a threat. On
this reading of the evidence, infants react to the emotions that are shown in the
expressions, not just to the patterns of changes that constitute the expressions. If this
account is correct, it is possible to argue that infants can see emotions in others even
though they lack the sort of knowledge that, in the theory of mind view, is necessary
to see patterns of changes in the face as expressions of emotions. This, of course, does
not rule out the possibility that infants may have a theory of mind—one that is
hardwired and, possibly, innate—which they use to make sub-personal infer-
ences about the mental states of others. These inferences would still be signif-
icantly different from the full-blown deductions (or rational reconstructions)
that, on certain versions of the theory of mind approach, lead to judgments
about what others feel.
In light of these considerations, one may ask the following question: Is there a way
of explaining our ability to see emotions that does not rely entirely on background
knowledge? This in turn raises a more general question: Is there any situation in
which our ability to see a certain object or property is not determined by what we
know about it? Philosophers accept that knowledge influences perception, although
they disagree on the extent to which knowledge determines the content of perception
(Peacocke 1992; McDowell 1994). If we want to explain the observation from the
case of infants, we need to consider those visual experiences that can be had
independently of knowledge (implicit or otherwise). These are experiences that can
be had solely by virtue of how the visual system works. Research into the visual
system (Adams et al. 1994; Kaufmann 1995) has shown that the ability to see specific
properties, such as colour and motion, is already present at birth and therefore does
not require prior knowledge of colour or motion. This is to say that an experience of,
say, something red can be had even though the perceiver does not know anything
about the colour red, the things that normally look red, or what an experience of red is
like. It is indeed one of the functions of the visual system that it detects colours.
Similarly, we may suppose that the ability to see what emotions others have also
depends on the working of the visual system.
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Visual perception is the result of physical properties, such as colours and shapes,
impinging upon the visual system. Since facial expressions play an important role in
our ability to tell what others feel, is there a way of understanding the role of
expressions that helps us make better sense of the intuition that we do, indeed, see
what emotions others have? Expressions are physical events consisting of patterns of
changes in the face. As such, they are things that we can see. More precisely, they are
things that can affect the visual system and consequently produce visual experiences.
This fact, however, does not explain how visual experiences of expressions can lead
to visual experiences of emotions, as one may perceive physical changes in the face
without perceiving the emotions that they express. To explain how we can see
emotions we need to suppose that expressions carry information about them—that
is, we need to suppose that seeing other people’s facial expressions is a way of
acquiring visual information about the emotions they have. I will examine this view
in the next section.
3 Expressions and Information
Expressions tell us all sorts of things about emotions. They can tell us what kinds of
emotions others have. For example, simply by looking at someone’s face, I can tell if
she is sad or happy. They can also tell us how intense those emotions are and how
long they seem to last. Thus I may be able to tell if someone is slightly, as opposed to
intensely, annoyed. In addition, I can say for how long that emotion lasts. In some
cases, expressions can also tell us how certain emotions arise in relation to objects
and events. Consider the case of someone who sees a child being attacked by a dog. If
you are looking at the person’s expression while she witnesses the attack, you will
learn that something terrible is happening in the vicinity, something that is responsi-
ble for the person’s sudden horror. In summary, expressions carry information about
several features of emotions. They can tell us what kinds of emotions others have,
how intense they are, how long they last and in relation to what objects or events they
occur.
At this stage, one may wonder how expressions get to carry information about
emotions. I will answer this question by considering the relationship between
expressions, on one hand, and emotions, on the other. There are different views about
this relationship and they roughly coincide with theories of emotions. One view
claims that emotions are patterns of changes in the body (Damasio 1994). Another
claims that emotions are experiences of these patterns (James 1884; Prinz 2004). Both
views say that expressions are the outwardly observable part of the bodily changes
that constitute or occur in correspondence with emotions. The fact that expressions
carry information about emotions is thus explained in terms of expressions being part
of what emotions are or supervene on. Another view is that emotions bring about
patterns of changes in the body, including the face (Lyons 1980; Roberts 2003). This
view implies that there is a dependence relationship between emotions and expres-
sions such that, in normal circumstances, expressions are produced by emotions and
other similar affective states, pain and pleasure, for example. The fact that expres-
sions normally occur as a result of emotions makes it more likely that when one
observes a pattern of changes in the face one is exposed to something that has been
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produced by an emotion. This explains how expressions can carry information about
emotions.
The view that expressions carry information about emotions (and other affective
states) is corroborated by empirical evidence. In a series of seminal studies, Paul
Ekman and colleagues (Ekman et al. 1969; Ekman and Friesen 1971; Izard 1971)
showed that some specific emotions, which they named basic emotions, appear to be
expressed in the same way in every human culture where this has been tested. In
particular, they found that basic emotions produce the same patterns of changes in the
face. These findings turn out to be surprising if we adopt the following reasoning. It is
a fact that different cultures develop different expressive tools. For example, different
cultures have different languages and communication systems. If we take expressions
to be signs for emotions, it is natural to expect that different cultures have different
ways of expressing emotions. While this is true of some expressions (Lutz and White
1986), it is not true of expressions of basic emotions, for basic emotions seem to have
the same expressions in all human cultures that have been studied so far. Ekman and
colleagues concluded that there is a connection between particular facial configura-
tions and specific emotions, and that such a connection is universal. They supposed
that this universal connection became established by natural selection. Although the
evidence has been widely challenged in recent years, especially on methodological
grounds (Russell 1994; Naab and Russell 2007), it is clear that there is a sense in
which some emotions, disgust for example, produce the same patterns of facial
changes in most humans. This means that, in all human cultures, a person who feels
disgust is likely to undergo the same, or roughly the same, pattern of changes in the
face. As a result, a specific pattern of changes is a reliable indicator for the occurrence
of disgust in others. This consideration lends support to the idea that expressions
carry information at least about basic emotions.
4 Some Objections
I should note that work in psychology challenges the approach that I have been
outlining so far. The psychologist Alan Fridlund (1994), for example, argues that the
function of expressions is not to show or manifest inner states like emotions, but to
signal social intentions and motives. A smile, for example, is not an expression of
happiness; it is an invitation for others to draw near. This view challenges a key claim
of my approach, namely the idea that expressions carry information about emotions.
Studies on emotion perception (Aviezer et al. 2008; Barrett and Kensinger 2010)
challenge another key claim, the one according to which visual experiences of emotions
can be had independently of background knowledge. There is indeed evidence that such
experiences encode information about contextual variables, including the situation in
which the emotional expressions occur (Barrett and Kensinger 2010) and the per-
ceiver’s emotional vocabulary (Lindquist et al. 2006; Barrett et al. 2007).
One may wonder if and how my view can withstand these objections. The answer
depends on how one constructs the opposing views. Consider Fridlund’s approach. If
one takes him to say that there is no relationship between emotions and expressions,
then my view is clearly incompatible with his approach. However, it seems unlikely
that Fridlund would want to deny any relationship between emotions and expressions.
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If, by contrast, one takes Fridlund to say that signalling emotions is not the primary
function of expressions, then his approach is compatible with mine. By saying that
expressions carry information about emotions, my view allows for the possibility that
expressions may have other functions—conveying social motives, for example—
besides the one I described.
How about the evidence showing that background and contextual factors play an
important role in visual experiences of other people’s emotions? Most philosophical
theories of perception acknowledge the influence of these factors. Some philosophers
(Dretske 1981; Peacocke 1983), however, think that, by carrying information about
the environment, visual experience encodes not only information about background
and contextual factors, it also encodes information about basic features of the
environment, such as colour and motion, and that this information would be acquired
in any case, even if the perceiver did not know anything about the world. Consider
the case of visual information about motion. I can see that something is moving even
when I do not know what it is that is moving. Thus, for example, I can see four bright
dots moving in the sky without knowing that it is an airplane. In this case information
about motion is acquired independently of information about the identity of the
moving object. Of course, this is not to say that background and contextual informa-
tion plays no role in perception. If I knew that I was looking at an airplane, I would
probably see the four dots as forming a familiar shape – that of an airplane with a light
on the tail, a light on each wing, and another light at the front. This is because the
content of perception comprises both visual information—information about light
and motion in my example—and collateral information like knowledge about
airplanes.
A similar argument carries over to the case of emotion perception. As will be clear
in the next section, I believe that the visual system functions to extract the informa-
tion that expressions carry about emotions and that it does so without relying on
background knowledge. In other words, part of what we see when we see other
people’s emotions is acquired in a way that depends not so much on background
knowledge, but rather on the working of the visual system. This view is entirely
compatible with the observation that background and contextual factors can enter the
content of perception, as they commonly do, and determine how we see what we see.
To put it in other terms, emotion perception is a complex process that combines
information about the source of the stimulus, that is, the emotion and the emotional
expression, and information about background and contextual variables. In this paper
I describe what may happen in early stages of vision, when the stimulus that reaches
the eyes originates from a physical event—a facial expression—that has an emotion
as its underlying cause. Of course, this is only part of the story and complex variables,
including knowledge and context, may influence the way emotion perception works.
The fact remains that if the hypothesis that the visual system functions to detect
emotions is correct, there really is something like seeing another person’s emotion.
5 Emotions and the Visual System
What I have so far observed shows that expressions carry information about emo-
tions. This phenomenon, however, is not sufficient for us to conclude that we see
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emotions. Consider the case of infrared light. It carries information about the tem-
perature of things. We can say that a creature is able to see an object’s temperature
only if it is endowed with a visual system sensitive to infrared light, that is, a visual
system able to extract the information about the object’s temperature and make it
available in the creature’s visual experience. Similar considerations apply to emo-
tions, for we can say that a creature sees emotions only if its visual system is able to
extract the information that expressions carry and make it available as part of the
content of the creature’s visual experience.
The question now is, How are we to determine whether the human visual system
extracts the information that expressions carry and makes it available in the content of
experience? This question ultimately concerns the working of the human visual
system in response to presentations of facial expressions of emotions. We know from
the study of vision that a reliable way of learning about the working of the visual
system is to consider the relationship between damage to the system and acquired
visual deficits. For example, evidence that the visual system functions to detect
motion comes from the observation that damage to specific areas of the visual cortex
results in a specific form of blindness that makes people unable to see motion (Zihl et
al. 1983). In line with this approach, it is plausible to think that if the visual system
functions to detect emotions, we should be able to observe a correspondence between
damage to the central nervous system and a visual deficit that makes people unable to
see what emotions others have.
Studies have shown that acquired damage to the amygdala results in impaired
recognition of negative emotions when they are expressed in the face. Ralph Adolphs
and colleagues (Adolphs et al. 1994; Adolphs 1995), for example, studied SM, a
30-year-old woman with damage to both amygdalae. During a series of tests, SM was
shown photographs and video clips of facial expressions. She was then asked to
identify the emotions to which the expressions corresponded. SM showed a signif-
icant impairment in the recognition of fear. Initially it was thought that the deficit
compromised SM’s ability to recall information about the ways in which fear is
expressed in the face (Adolphs 2002). This hypothesis was then abandoned when
researchers noticed that SM did not spontaneously attend to the eye region of faces
(Adolphs et al. 2005). Kennedy and Adolphs (2010) have recently replicated their
study and found that SM’s reduced focus on the eye region is particularly pronounced
during the first fixation to the face and is almost normal during subsequent fixations.
A possible interpretation of the evidence gathered in these and various other
studies is that the amygdala plays a key role in directing attention to specific features
of expressions, features that carry a particular weight in terms of the information they
provide about specific emotions, fear in particular. Fear is an emotion that mainly
produces changes in the eye region and upper side of the face. The fact that SM did
not spontaneously attend to this area during her first fixation to the face explains why
she was not immediately able to recognize fear. One may speculate that the visual
experiences that SM formed during the first saccade lacked information about
changes in the eye region, and, consequently lacked information about emotions,
such as fear, that typically produce changes in that area of the face. One may further
speculate that SM’s visual experience is analogous to the experience that a healthy
person has when she looks at someone who is wearing large sunglasses. In this case,
the person’s experience lacks information about what goes on in the eye region, and
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consequently provides no visual information about the observed person’s mental
state.
These considerations suggest that there is a visual mechanism involved in perception
of specific emotions in others. Although it is not yet clear how the mechanism extracts
the information that expressions carry about emotions, it is evident that damage to parts
of the physiological structures underpinning the mechanism can compromise a person’s
ability to see what emotions others have. The evidence I have examined suggests that the
amygdala is a key component of this mechanism. Of course, other brain structures are
likely to be involved in the same mechanism as well as in the process of acquiring
information about other types of emotions. Evidence from studies of subjects with
Huntington’s disease (Sprengelmeyer et al. 1996), for example, show that the basal
ganglia play an important role in people’s ability to see disgust in others.
6 Conclusions
I opened my discussion with the following question: How is it that we can tell what
emotions others have by looking at their facial expressions? A natural answer is that
we see their emotions. This answer, however, raises a further question. Since emo-
tions are not physical objects, how can we possibly see them? I have argued that
expressions can be viewed as physical events that carry information about emotions.
This is either because expressions are part of what emotions are or, on a different
view, because they are part of the overall changes that emotions produce when they
affect the body. I have then examined evidence from studies showing that damage to
specific brain areas can result in a deficit characterized by the inability to see and
consequently recognize fear when it is expressed in the face. I have used this evidence
to show that there is something like a visual mechanism to detect fear.
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